已故美國牧師Ralph W. Sockman的這句話轉來的:「The larger the island of knowledge, the longer the shoreline of wonder.」 十九世紀法國的作家Gustave Flaubert(1821-1880)的話:「There is no truth, there is only perception.」
除英語外的所有德國語言已經介紹了truth「逼真度」和truth「真實性」術語上的區分。為了表達"真實性",北方日爾曼從「sanna」「斷言,申明」選擇派生的名詞,而大陸西日爾曼 (德國和荷蘭) 選擇 wâra延續「信心、 信任、 契約」(同源到斯拉夫 věra「(宗教) 的信念」,但受拉丁文--The Latin Word Verus has many meanings, mainly: true, real, proper, right.—影響)。羅曼語言使用跟隨拉丁語 veritas,儘管希臘elethia(Aletheia is a Greek word variously translated as "unclosedness", " unconcealedness", "disclosure" or "truth")、 俄羅斯pravda{真理報}和塞爾維亞 istina 有單獨的詞源起源。(古月語譯自 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-Nomenclature, orthography, and etymology)
真理最經常用於表示符合事實或現實,或忠於原本或標準或理想。通常理解真理的反面是謬誤,其中,相應地,還可以用於邏輯、事實或倫理意義。真理的概念是在各種場合討論和辯論,包括哲學和宗教。許多人類活動取決這個概念,是假設而不是討論的主題,包括科學、法律和日常生活。(古月語譯自 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-Nomenclature, orthography, and etymology)
各種關於真理的理論和意見繼續在學者、 哲學家和神學家之間受爭論。語言和文字是人們之間傳達資訊的一種手段,用來確定什麼是「真理」的方法被稱為真理標準。有不同訴求像是甚麼構成真理這樣的問題:甚麼事情是有能力確定(truthbearers)甚麼是true 或 false ; 如何定義和查明真理;基於信仰和經驗為基礎的知識扮演的角色;和真理是否主觀的或客觀的、相對的或絕對。(古月語譯自 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-Nomenclature, orthography, and etymology)
問題是甚麼是適當的基礎決定甚麼樣的字、符號、思想和信念可能恰當地考慮為 true,是否是由一個人或整個社會,是由下面列出的五個最普遍的實質性理論(融貫論、符合論、構造論、共識論)處理。每個理論提出了由著名學者廣泛共用的觀點。(古月語譯自http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-Major Theotries of Truth )
然而,實質理論不普遍被接受。最近制訂了「緊縮」或者「極簡主義」理論的真理已成為舊的實質理論的競爭對手。極簡主義推理中心圍繞概念的詞像對語句不會斷言關於它的甚麼重大意義,例如,任何關於其本性的事。極簡主義推理意識到真理作為標籤應用到一般話題表示協定,強調訴求,或形成一般假設.(古月語譯自http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-Major Theories of Truth)
康德說: 「真理,就是說,由認知的共識裡與它的物件一致。由於這只是有名無實的定義,我的認知,來計算為真(true),是假設同意它的物件。現在我可以和物件比較我的認知,然而,僅僅是因為認知它。因此我的認知應該確認它本身,這是很不足夠的真理。因為物件是在我以外,認知卻是在我之內,所有我還可以通過判斷是否我對物件的認知一致於我認知的物件。古人稱這種圈子解釋 diallelon(循環定義或論證)。其實邏輯學家總是被懷疑論者責備這個錯誤,他看到以這一真理的定義這就是當一個人在法庭面前作出的陳述,和對證人做如此投訴沒有一名證人是他熟知,但他想要建立他的誠信通過維護一個他叫作為證人的人是誠實的人。這一指控是基礎。所顯示問題的僅有的解決沒有資格是不可能和對每個人」Kant said:”Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. The ancients called such a circle in explanation a diallelon(Diallelon is a noun that refers to a tautological definition; a description which contains the word described; the definition of a term by means of another which is defined by means of the first. It simply means defining in a circle. • Logic. A fallacy in reasoning in which the premise is used to prove the conclusion, and the conclusion used to prove the premise.). And actually the logicians were always reproached with this mistake by the sceptics, who observed that with this definition of truth it is just as when someone makes a statement before a court and in doing so appeals to a witness with whom no one is acquainted, but who wants to establish his credibility by maintaining that the one who called him as witness is an honest man. The accusation was grounded, too. Only the solution of the indicated problem is impossible without qualification and for every man” (Kant, Immanuel (1801), The Jäsche Logic, in Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 557-558.).
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